Self-liberation and self-immolation in modern Chinese thought by Australian National University
The 39th George Ernest Morrison Lecture in Ethnology 1978 
SELF-LIBERATION AND SELF-IMMOLATION 
IN MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT 
MARK ELVIN 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNNERSITY 
CANBERRA 1978 
SELF-LIBERATION AND SELF-IMMOLATION 
IN MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT 
MARK ELVIN 
The Thirty-ninth 
George Ernest Morrison Lecture 
in ethnology 1978 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
CANBERRA 
1978 
© Mark Elvin I 978. 
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealings for the 
purposes of private study , research, criticism or review. as 
permitted under the copyright Act, no part may be reproduced 
by any process without written permission. 
ISBN 909596 38 7 
Printed by Socpac Printery 
Research Schools of Social Sciences and 
Pacific Studies 
The Australian National University 
Canberra 
SELF-LIBERATION AND SELF-IMMOLATION 
IN MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT 
Many Chinese thinkers in the first half of the twentieth century 
present a paradox. They begin with a search for the liberation of the 
self. Again and again they end with the desire for the ~xtinction of 
the self: for its absorption into a collective consciousness, the 
homogenization ..Q[ its individuality, its perpetuation as a fragment of a 
greater Social Self, or its assimilation into the flow of a progressing 
human history. In the few minutes that we have together, I would like 
to set before you the outlines of this paradox, aware of my own 
deficiencies - being by profession an economic historian - in matters of 
philosophy, but persuaded that it is a subject worth struggling with, for 
it goes to the heart of the modern Chinese feeling for life. 
The links of our paradox with tradition are evident. It is appropriate 
to recall. in this connection, Professor Tu Wei-ming's characterization of 
older neo-Confucian values. "Society ," he says, "is in essence an 
extended self. The internalization of social values . . . can . . . be 
interpreted as a creative step taken by the self to enter into human-
relatedness for the sake of ... its own realization." 1 "Man," he says 
elsewhere , "is a moral being who through self-effort extends his human 
sensitivity to all the beings of the universe so as to realize himself in the 
midst of the world . " 2 What is new in the thinkers we are to discuss is 
often their attempt , in ways that vary, to give these old notions both a 
more precise definition and a more extended application, emancipated 
from the particularities of Chinese culture. 
Let us begin with T'an Ssu-t'ung, since he embodies the paradox more 
clearly than anyone else. Tan was born in 1865, and was murdered by 
the Empress Dowager in 1898 for his reformist activities. He sought 
this death more or less deliberately; and his remarks on the irrelevance 
of personal extinction must be read with respect, because he showed he 
meant what he said. His one work of importance is A Study of Altruism, 
written in 1896 and published in 1898. It would be preferable, if we had 
more time, to start with some of his poems, for their themes of suffering, 
death, and the Buddhist sense of the illusory nature of the world, reveal 
better than anything else the disturbing intensity .of-his character. 1 Let 
us, however, plunge in medias res and look at his hatred of the constraints 
imposed on the individual by accepted values. 
In the preface to the Study of Altruism he wrote: 4 
From the time I was young until I was grown up, I everywhere 
encountered the afflictions of the bonds and relationships [of 
conventional morality] . I swam deep in their bitterness. It was 
almost something that a living person could not endure. The 
burden was deadly, and yet one did not die. 
In his peroration he declared that all the old bonds must be destroyed: 5 
First we must break through the net of profits and remuneration. 
Then we must break through the net of conventional scholarship ... 
Then we must break through the net of having rulers. Then we 
must break through the net of moral norms. Then through the net 
of [believing in] Heaven. Then through the net of the world's 
religions. Last of all, we must break through the net of Buddhism. 
His attack on Confucianism began with the hallowed doctrine of 
'names'. By 'names' is meant what we should call 'prescriptive definitions' 
or, more crudely, 'labels'. 
Names [he wrote] are created by men. Superiors use them 
to control their inferiors, so that they are obliged to accord them 
respect. . . Rulers use names to hobble ministers. Officials use 
names to keep the people on the [desired] track. Fathers use 
names to oppress their sons. Husbands use names to keep their 
wives in bondage. . . How can the slightest feelings of altruism 
survive in them?6 
Ritual, the moralized manners that governed personal relations, was 
equally abhorrent. In particular, he disliked the Confucian concept of 
'closeness and remoteness' that lay at the heart of the kinship system. 
The old moral code graded the extent of one's obligations, and the 
intensity of the appropriate feelings, according to the proximity of the 
relatives with whom one was dealing. T'an would have none of this: 7 
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If a distinction is made between closeness and remoteness, there 
come into being the prescriptive definitions on which ritual is 
based. . The heart is forced into that in which it takes no 
delight. The body is bound to do that which incommodes it. 
If there is constraint, then the artificialities of precedence and 
deference, and of bowing and kneeling, become irksome. If there 
is coercion, then the ideals of utmost sincerity and searing grief 
become an affliction. 
In the Utopia of the future said T'an, there will "be no 'fathers' and no 
'sons' . How much less will there be 'rulers' and 'ministers'! None of the 
prescriptive definitions with which despots, those robbers of the people, 
have coerced and bound them will any longer exist or be applicable ."B 
He condemned most of the philosophers of the imperial period as 
having been the willing tools of tyranny, who did their best to control 
men's minds through morality . He concluded bitterly :9 
The function of a prescriptive definition is not merely to obstruct 
the mouth, so that people are unable to speak in a straightforward 
fashion. It is also to imprison their minds, su that they do not dare 
to think matters through. There is no better way of making the 
Chinese people stupid than a complexity of prescriptive definitions. 
The ideals in whose name T'an Ssu-t'ung was demanding what appears, 
at first sight, to have been the wholesale demolition of neo-Confucian 
values were equality and personal freedom. This is evident from his 
praise of friendship: 10 
The least harmful to human life of the five relationships, and the 
most beneficial, with no trace of bitterness and a delight like that 
of fresh water, is friendship .. . Why is this so? First, it is equal. 
Second. it is free . Third, its only object is [mutual] development. 
To summarize what this means, it is simply that the right to personal 
autonomy is not lost. 
In 11olitics, the new values led him to an anarchism modified only by a 
hint of the old Chinese concept of an all-embracing world-order: 11 
In the government of the world, there should be an 
All-Under-Heaven, but no nation-states. . . Since everyone is free, 
no one should be the citizens of any particular state. If there 
are no states, then boundaries will dissolve, wars cease, suspicions 
end, distinctions between self and others vanish, and equality appear. 
As far as his own country was concerned he observed that "Westerners 
are depressed by the stultifying effect that the three bonds [of 
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Confucianism] have on China. They urge that China should be governed 
in accordance with [the dictates of] Heaven. If Heaven is used to 
control men, then the way of the world will be egalitarian, and no one 
will lose his right to autonomy."12 
The picture that I have just painted of T'an Ssu-t'ung as the champion 
of individual liberation is authentic but misleading. That is to say, the 
quotations from his work are genuine enough, but the context is 
missing. T'an's vision, in which everything else in his philosophy found 
its reason for being and its proper place, was what might be called a 
'materialist mysticism'. 13 Some may quarrel with this phrase because 
of the importance that he attaches to two traditional concepts: the soul 
of the spirit and the soul of the body. I would still propose it to you as 
the best simple summary of his view of the world. Consider the 
following passage: 14 
4 
Throughout the world of laws, the world of space, and the world of 
all that lives, from the vast to the microscopic, there is something 
that fills them all, everywhere holds them together, coordinates 
them, and weaves them into one. It cannot be seen, or heard, or 
tasted, and there is no way to give it a name, but I designate it 
'the ether'. Confucius termed its manifestation in actions 'altruism', 
'the primal', and 'the basic nature'. Master Mo called it 'loving 
without discrimination', the Buddha 'the sea of the true nature', and 
'compassionate sorrow'. Jesus spoke of it as 'the spiritual soul', 
'loving others like oneself, and 'regarding enemies as friends'. 
Scientists name it 'chemical affinity' and 'the force of attraction'. 
This entity is all of these. . . It is the ether that lets the eyes see, 
the ears hear, the nose smell, the tongue taste, and the body 
touch. . . If you were to split an atom down to nothing, and to 
observe what it is that holds it together, that would be the ether. . . 
The moon and the earth attract each other and do not fly apart. 
The eight planets, Terra with Luna, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, 
Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune, and the countless asteroids and 
comets, all attract each other and do not scatter. . . The starry 
clusters of the Milky Way, whose number is as the sands of the 
River Ganges, attract each other and do not scatter. . . All this 
attraction is what I call the ether. . . Only when scholars have 
clearly recognized its substance and its function may they then go 
on to talk about altruism. 
In Tan's view we are part of a cosmic flux of forces - forces that are, in 
some sense, material, mental, and moral all at the same time. He 
continues: 15 
Just as people know that the nerves carrying the forces of the brain 
join the five sense-organs and the skeleton into a single body, so 
they ought to know that electrical forces join Heaven and Earth, 
all creatures, others and ourselves, into a single body. . . My mind 
has the power to affect others, so that they share my thoughts ... 
In the last analysis, there is no barrier between others and one's 
self, for which reason the innermost feelings are as if open to 
view. Scholars should also recognize clearly that electricity is the 
same as brain. Since electricity is present everywhere, one's self is 
present everywhere. When foolish divisions are made between 
others and one's self, altruism disappears. 
Human relationships should be absorbed into friendship alone : 16 
According to Buddhist teaching, all alike, regardless of whether 
they are rulers or ministers, husbands and fathers, or wives and 
mothers, or sons, or elder or younger brothers, should leave the 
family and take vows, becoming members of the monastic 
community. . . There is nothing that can be called a state. It is as 
if all were one state. There is nothing that can be called a family. 
It is as if all were one family. There is nothing that can be called a 
body. It is as if all were one body. 
He praised Jesus. Jesus, he said, had caused men to have "the power to 
be their own masters" but had also "smashed the selfishness of having 
the family and the state".11 
It is at this point in Tan's philosophy that the self, after being 
liberated, begins to disappear again. The better to understand its 
extinction, however, we must leave the mysticism for a moment and 
look more closely at the materialism. T'an's study of Western science 
had taught him, that the difference between "sweet smells and stinking 
odours" was as he put it, no more than "a slight difference in the 
arrangement of the atoms". From this he concluded that it was a mistake 
to think of anything as having "a fixed and unchanging nature". The 
conservation of matter in chemical reactions also seemed to him to 
s 
prove that "existence and non-existence are concentration and dispersion. 
There is no creation and no destruction." 18 
Why then should we fear death? 
To love life and to fear death [he said] may be called a great 
delusion and a lack of understanding. It results from being blind 
to non-creation and non-destruction. . . If people cannot overcome 
their fear of death, and are shrinking, confused, and without the 
courage to act, they will all the more evade their involvement with 
the human predicament; they will abandon themselves more and 
more to evil, pay unceasing attention to making a favourable 
impression but be ill-at-ease everywhere, and think of nothing but 
their own pleasure and peace of mind. How can All-Under-Heaven 
be brought under good government again? ... If they think only 
of their lives or, as one might say, of those few decades so swiftly 
gone, their minds will remain fixed on eating, drinking, copulating, 
possessions, income, reputation, and status. . . Did Heaven give 
birth to men merely to furnish them with amusement and then 
forthwith to destroy them?t9 
After setting forth a theory of the chemical reincarnation of the body, in 
which the atoms of a corpse reassemble co "become new people and 
new things", he declares "how much less does the essence that is in the 
bodily soul pay regard to birth and destructior:!" And he cites with 
approval the opinion of the seventeenth-century philosopher Wang 
Fu-chih that "when a Sage dies, his vital essence divides and becomes a 
multitude of men of worth."20 
Tan's ethical theories are difficult to disentangle. At one point he 
argues that "in Heaven and Earth there is only altruism". Evil has no 
ultimate existence, in the sense that there are no intrinsically evil acts, 
but only circumstances under which a given act, like killing or copulating, 
may be wrong. 21 At another point he seems to be saying that moralizing 
and moral codes destroy morality, which would arise naturally if only 
altruism were allowed unfettered expression. 22 To pursue the 
complications that arise here would take us too far from our theme. 
There is no doubt, however, that his ruling passion was the idea of 
progress. "I know," he said, "that the movement of the world is from 
the bitter and towards the sweet."23 Constant innovation was at the heart 
of life. "The greatest good," he declared, "is to be new each day. Not to 
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be new each day is the greatest evil." 24 Those who oppose reform, he tells 
us, "themselves cut off the transforming potential in their own lives, an 
act that is utterly opposed to altruism, and end up as totally antiquated, 
corrupted, and soulless rubbish!"25 Following the ancients was a form of 
suicide. Advance was not, it was true, easy. As he put it , "if the True Way 
rises by a foot, the impediments rise by ten. The greater the progress, 
the more the obstacles."26 Man's lot was therefore perpetual struggle. 
It might possibly be argued that T'an's philosophical commitment to 
progress was not unequivocal, on the basis of his remark that "the past 
and the present are equal" ;
27 
but the tenor of his book, taken as a 
whole, shows a clear belief in two sorts of progress. One was the usual 
material variety. His attitude towards it may be seen in his enthusiasm 
for machinery, and for the new means of transport that had, as he said, 
"reduced a journey of a thousand stages to almost a foot." 2s The other 
was spiritual progress. 
A hint of what he meant by spiritual progress is given by four of the 
twenty-seven gnomic propositions that preface The Study of Altruism: 29 
7. The visible embodiment of intercommunication is equality. 
8. If there is intercommunication then the place of honour is 
certain to be given to the spiritual soul. If there is equality 
then the physical soul may become the spiritual soul. 
9. The spiritual soul belongs to the domain of enlightened 
discernment. The physical soul belongs to the domain of 
the day-to-day knowledge of the unenlightened. 
10. Enlightened discernment is born from altruism. 
This use of Buddhist terminology is instructive; but it is Buddhism with a 
difference. T'an's goal is a collective enlightenment. For this, the self 
as such must be extinguished in the totality. Consider these strange 
words from his closing pages: 30 
The fundamental reason why others and the self cannot inter-
communicate is that the ways in which the ethers of the brain move 
are different for each of us. Whenever I am in a state of peaceful 
introspection, I can see the movements of the ethers of my brain. 
Their colour is a pure white, their light clear and sparkling. They 
are as fine as silken threads, their shapes sinuous and twisting. This 
is how they move: they alter all the time in an undetermined way 
between long and short, plentiful and sparse, existent and non-
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existent, with a swiftness for which no words are adequate, like 
flashes of lightning among the clouds, free from the least imperfection. 
It is my belief that the brain is electricity. At first I thought 
that it moved at random. Later, I perceived that this is not so. 
When the multitude of thoughts is transparent, they are hidden in 
their tranquillity, and not visible to the eye. If, by some chance, a 
thought emerges, patterns of electricity appear, and thought tirelessly 
follows thought, their movements never ceasing. When thoughts 
change, the movements are likewise very different; and the more 
thoughts, the more differences. They accumulate in so much 
complexity, and so intermingled, that they no longer form patterns. 
One can deduce from the different movements that accompany 
different thoughts that the manner of the movement is determined 
by the thoughts, and is of a specific type ... 
The movements [of the ethers of the brain] constitute conscious-
ness. Since the ways in which the ethers of the brain move have 
countless dissimilarities, and consciousness is borne along upon 
them, confusion arises. As every person, every place, every time, 
and every phenomenon is different, how can there be a means 
whereby others and the self can communicate? The fault lies in the 
mutual incompatibility, or, in other words, in consciousness. If we 
now seek inter-communication between them, we must extinguish 
consciousness. If we want to extinguish consciousness, we must 
change the way in which the ethers of our brain move. Contact 
with the outside must be cut off. Internally, we must return to 
simplicity. We must become simpler and simpler until nothingness 
is reached, at which point consciousness will have been destroyed. 
When consciousness has been destroyed the self will have been 
removed along with it. When the self ·~as been removed, differences 
will have been annihilated. When differences have been annihilated, 
equality appears. When equality has been attained, every entity 
will be penetrated by an awareness of every other entity, with not 
the least barrier between them. This is the culmination of the 
intercommunication of self and others .... This is altruism! 
The transformation has been effected. The call for the liberation of the 
individual self has become the demand for its disappearance. 
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T'an was widely read in the first half of the twentieth century. How 
far, though, did he express ideas that were characteristic of Chinese 
thought during this period? I think it is true to say that, while he was 
unusual in the ruthlessness of his conclusions, we can find the notions we 
have just been discussing in partial or less explicit form in modern 
Chinese thinkers of almost every persuasion. Even in Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei 
( 1868-1940), who based his philosophy upon aesthetics, an echo can be 
heard. Professor Duiker has written, in a recent article on Ts'ai, that he 
"placed a premium ... on an unfettered search for individual self-
realization", but that "through self-realization, all the individual wills 
in the world would eventually be expanded into a common will. .. a true 
harmony .. .in the spiritual all-one". 31 I should like, therefore, to 
illustrate at least the plausibility of my assertion by looking briefly at 
four philosophers and two men of letters, all of whose important work 
was published between 1890 and 1950. 
K'ang Yu-wei was born in 1858 and died in 1927. He was best known 
in his life as a political reformer, but I shall consider him today only in 
his capacity as the author of The Great Uniformity, a detailed blueprint 
for Utopia, first drafted in the 1880s, but not published in full until 
1935, eight years after his death. When he was twenty years old, he 
had a vision, which he recounted as follows: 32 
I was sitting in a calm frame of mind when all at once I saw that 
Heaven and Earth and I were all the same entity. A great light 
shone forth. I thought I was a Sage, and laughed with delight. 
Suddenly I called to mind the sufferings of humanity, and I wept 
in my grief. 
After sleepless nights of meditation, he concluded that Heaven had given 
him his talents in order to cure the agonies of mankind. He resolved to 
make his ambition "the good administration of the world."33 
K'ang was, therefore, a would-be Boddhisattva who became a 
Benthamite. The cruelty of life haunted him. "The azure heaven and 
the round earth are nothing but a great slaughter-yard, a great prison." 34 
Progress, he said, was to be able to "reduce men's pain and to increase 
their pleasure." 35 So The Great Uniformity is devoted to strictly 
utilitarian ends. 
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Avoidable unhappiness, thought K'ang, was due to inequalities created 
by nature and by man. Thus having different states caused wars, and 
K'ang advocated as a remedy world government and a world language. 
Having social classes was a violation of men's natural equality, bred 
bitterness, and hindered the development of the talents of those in the less 
privileged groups. So - no more classes. Complete physical and mental 
uniformity was essential to happiness. Therefore different ethnic groups 
had to be homogenized by means of population transfers and mixed 
marriages. Eventually everyone was to be of the same colour, the same 
shape, and the same intelligence. 36 
Women had suffered from the subservience they were expected to 
show towards men, on no better grounds than sexual differences. Except 
in matters relating to the bearing of children, men and women were 
therefore to be treated as equals; and on all formal occasions they were 
to wear unisex clothing. 37 The family was a source of small-scale 
collective selfishness, and was to be abolished. Children could then be 
brought up in institutions in identical fashion. "Otherwise," he said. 
"people's characters will not be of the same kind." ·18 Men had varying 
dispositions and had to be "smelted and forged", a process most easily 
effected when they were young. Thus, he concluded, "morality may 
easily be unified and behaviour made identical." 39 The economy was 
to be run by the state, to prevent the re-emergence of rich and poor. 
But K'ang remained beset by the fear that exceptional and charismatic 
personalities might reappear; and he ordained that such people were to be 
thrown into prison.4o 
The wilderness was to be municipalized and homogenized. All animals 
harmful to man were to be exterminated. The others were to be 
domesticated, kept in zoos, or employed as servants. Birds would perform 
as choristers. 41 Universal economic development - the irrigation of 
deserts, the levelling of mountain-ranges, and the construction of 
artifical islands - would create a global parkland equipped with every 
consumer amenity, even hanging glass cages from which to admire the 
view.-12 The human spirit would, he hoped, be kept alive by modest doses 
of emulation between administrative units in economic output, the 
advancement of knowledge, and the practice of altruism.4 .l 
K'ang's views are fairly well known in the West, 44 and there is no 
need to elaborate on them further here. For our present purpose, the 
important thing is to note the contrast between two aspects of his thinking. 
JO 
K'ang repeatedly affirms that "all men have a right to freedom conferred 
on them by Heaven". 45 In his chapter on women he denounces the 
bitterness that arises when someone is forced , all his or her life, to 
do something that he or she hates. 46 Yet his recipe for general happiness 
is the destruction of all that might make an individual individual . 
When we turn to recent Chinese philosophers of a more traditional 
bent, we also find this pattern of the liberation of the individual self 
followed by its resubmergence in a greater, all-encompassing whole, 
though the form and context are more psychological than social . I shall 
take as an example Feng Yu-Ian, who was born in 189 5 and is still alive. 
His system may best be described by his own term 'neo-neo-Confucianism' 
(hsin Ii hsueh), though he is an eclectic who owes much to Chuang-tzu and 
Chuang-tzu's commentator Kuo Hsiang, and something to Plato and Hegel. 
Out of his several books on his own philosophy, the most relevant to 
our topic is his A New Examination of Man, published in 1943. In 1950 
Feng gave his allegiance to the Communist revolution, and renounced his 
earlier work as erroneous. When the present tense is used in what 
follows, it must therefore be understood to be in accordance with the 
convention that ideas are, in some sense, timeless. 
For Feng, man's most distinctive characteristic is conscious awareness. 
Personal development consists in the expansion of this conscious 
awareness. According to the level of his awareness, a man may live in one 
of four distinct spiritual realms. These are, in ascending order, the Realm 
of Nature, the Realm of Utility, the Realm of Morality, and the Realm of 
the Universal. He summarizes the psychological state that each represents 
as follows:47 
In the realm of Nature, men do not know that there is a self ... 
In the realm of Utility, men have a self. In this realm, all a man's 
actions are selfish ... In the realm of Morality, man is without 
self. He acts morally, for the sake of morality ... In the realm of 
the Universal, man is likewise without the self, but this selflessness 
must be called 'the Great Selflessness'. 
In his view, morality derives from man's being a member of society. 
Moral actions are defined as those consciously directed to seeking the 
happiness of others, without any thought of personal advantage therefrom. 
"A man," he says, "must sacrifice himself in order to seek the benefit 
of society. " 48 
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As awareness advances one realizes that one is not just a part of society 
but also of the Universe; and, to quote Feng again, "man must 
contribute not only to society but also to the Universe." 49 The 
enlightened man sees his own life and all phenomena as "parts of the 
Embodiment of the Way". The term 'Embodiment of the Way' is, 
he says, "a general name for all transformations" , or "the Great 
Phenomenon that has no beginning and no end", or even "the flux of 
operational effects". 50 Such a man is not only aware that he is part of 
the Great Totality; he actually becomes identified with it, or identical 
to it. "When a man has become identified with the Great Totality," says 
Feng, "for him the distinction between self and non-self no longer 
exists." 5 1 
He then imagines a sceptic asking how a part, that is to say man, can 
be identified with a whole, that is to say the Universe. The answer is 
Mind ; and he cites with approval a famous passage from the sixteenth-
century philosopher Wang Yang-ming about how Intelligence pervades 
the Universe, so that there are no divisions between the self and other 
entities. 52 "Man's mind ," Feng asserts, "may likewise be a part of the 
Cosmos, but the range of its thoughts is not restricted to part of the 
Cosmos." 53 To materialists who argue that the mind is no more than 
the movements of the brain, he retorts that the mind depends on the 
brain, but only in the way that a picture depends on paints and paper 
for its existence. 54 Furthermore, "when one becomes identified with 
the Great Totality, the self is by no means entirely extinguished." 
Rather, what occurs is "an unlimited expansion of the self." "In this 
unlimited expansion the self is in fact the ruler of the Great Totality." 
Finally, says Feng, "religions consider God to be the ruler of the Universe, 
but the man who is in the realm of the Universal is aware that his self is the 
ruler of the Universe. If the ruler of the Universe is God, then his self 
is God." 55 
For the man still in the realm of Utility, that world ruled by the 
pursuit of pleasure, income, and publicity, his life is "the continuation of 
the existence of the self', and his death "the destruction of its existence." 
For the man in the realm of Morality , death is but the conclusion of his 
duties and obligations. Since his acts have an exclusively social 
significance, personal extinction is of no deep importance. He sees 
himself as a link between the sages of the past and generations yet to 
come. For the man in the realm of the Universal , life and death are both 
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what Feng calls "following the transformations". In the words of Kuo 
Hsiang, he is "one with the Creative Force"; and so, as Kuo says of 
himself, "wherever I go, I encounter myself. What can be gained, 
what lost? Who dies, who is born?" Feng glosses this with the observation 
that "one who has become one with the Great Changes is aware that he 
himself is without beginning and without end." The self, co-identified 
with the Great Totality, exists across all space and all time. 56 
All this drama is internal. What Feng is talking about is acquiring a 
certain state of mind in which all one's acts, however trivial, acquire a 
deep cosmic meaning. The content of these acts is largely taken for 
granted. "The man in the realm of the Universal," he says, "has in no 
sense to act differently from the mass of the ordinary people."57 
Indeed, "it is the special characteristic of neo-Confucianism to seek 
the realm of the Universal in the actions of one's everyday life."58 
One's obligation is simply to "fulfil the duties arising from one's 
personal relations and one's job." 59 Like an actor, he says, who has 
been assigned a part in a play, one must accept one's role and play it to 
the best of one's ability. 6<l He does not consider that one might question 
the casting and the script. 
Feng has a curious but revealing argument that a landscape painting 
must always be more beautiful than a real landscape, because it contains 
more 'spirit' . 61 This epitomizes his withdrawal into the philosopher's 
equivalent of infantile dreams of omnipotence. The man in the realm of 
the Universal, he says, "has transcended the limitations of the real world." 
Therefore, "he is not subject to these limitations. Not to be subject to 
limitations is what is called freedom." 62 Elsewhere, Feng equates 
freedom with an "awareness" of Heaven; and it is only a slight over-
simplification of his position to say that, for him, freedom is a matter of 
psychology. Und das Schone bhiht nur im Gesang. 63 
When we turn to philosophers who were more deeply influenced by the 
modern West, we find some slight but significant changes. The first of 
these is the belief in the permanently significant contribution of the 
individual. Hu Shih ( 1891-1962) wrote the following moving words 
about the death of his mother:64 
As I reviewed the life of my dead mother, whose activities had 
never gone beyond the trivial details of the home but whose 
influence could be clearly seen on the faces of those men and 
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women who came to mourn her death ... I came to the conclusion 
that everything is immortal. This line of reasoning led me to what 
may be called the religion of social immortality, because it is 
essentially based on the idea that the individual self which is a 
product of the accumulated effect of the social self, leaves an 
indelible mark of everything it is and everything it does upon that 
larger Self which may be termed Society, or Humanity, or the 
Greater Being ... This Great Self lives forever as the everlasting 
testimony of the triumphs and failures of the numberless individual 
selves. 
Hu distinguished this theory from the traditional idea that a select few 
survived through the memory of their virtues, achievements, and writings. 
He ascribed social imperishability to every action of every person, 
trivial as well as exceptional, evil as well as good. He argued that this 
was not "revering Society and annihilating the individual" since, though 
"the world of today is what it is through the accumulated virtues and 
sins of our predecessors, the world of the future depends entirely on the 
virtues and sins that we ourselves accumulate." 6s He concluded:66 
I must say: "Of no word that I utter should I dare to forget its 
social influence. Of no step that I take should I dare to fo1get its 
social influence." This is my duty towards the Greater Self. 
If one can act like this, this is morality, this is religion. 
A second novelty, prefigured by Tan Ssu-t 'ung, is the worship of 
the future as the supreme validating principle of morality. A notable 
exponent of this is Chang Tung-sun, who was born in 1886 and is the 
most Westernized of Chinese philosophers, as at home with Aristotle, 
Kant, and Einstein as he is with Buddhism, his earliest philosophic 
passion. 67 
In his tract A Fledgling Philosophy, published in 1929, Chang 
describes the universe as a spatial structure, composed of "the interweaving 
of countless structures", that evolves through time. 68 The distinguishing 
feature of this "evolutionary process" is "an increased intercooperation 
throughout the entire entity". From this he argues that "if a man's life 
has any value, that is because man's life in the universe has a relatively ... 
progressive place. If it does not, and has an insignificant place in the 
universe ... then one can deduce that man's life is valueless." 69 Strictly 
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speaking, he adds, value is relative, and man's life lacks any absolute 
value or purpose; but in a sense one can regard its purpose as the immanent 
one of the self-completion of the personality. 70 
In his book The Philosophy of Morals, published in 1931, Chang says 
that the goal of each individual's life is to break free from the constraints 
of time and space, from mere immediate existence in the here and now. 
Culture and civilization represent a collective effort on the part of all 
humanity to achieve this object for its members. "I am strongly opposed," 
he writes, "to the idea of returning to nature." 71 "What is noble in man 
is that he can mark out an independent domain from the natural world , 
throughout which the laws of nature reign, in which he can put into 
effect laws at variance with the laws of nature."72 
It is knowledge and awareness that make it possible for civilized man 
to participate in this process of collective self-realization. He uses the 
metaphor of two lamps in a dark room. "The lamps," he says, "cannot 
have their existence in common, but their light can." People are like 
lamps. irreducibly individual, but knowledge, which is "the value of 
life" as opposed to its mere existence, is like the light, and belongs to a 
shared, objective domain, that of culture. 73 He concludes: "The reason 
that I say that human life has a purpose is because there is knowledge; 
and it is possible for it to change a purposeless natural existence into a 
purposeful idealistic existence." 74 And the advance of knowledge is 
"'absolutely irreversible". 75 
Chang's starting-point is the individual. "If." he says, "the spirit of an 
individual can create something that will add to the existing general 
stock of culture. this creation represents the forward march of culture." 
But he warns that if it is too individualistic it will have no value as a 
contribution. 1° In general, the "lesser self', or the "false self', can 
only attain any value if the sublimation of selfish desires can lead to an 
awareness of the "greater self', or "true self'. 77 What is society, then? 
ls it a super-being in its own right, or simply an association for the 
benefit of individuals? Chang says he regards himself as a follower of 
Wundt: the social mind is more than just an agglomeration of individual 
minds. 78 The appearance of an inherited tendency to moral behaviour 
he explains on the sociobiological grounds of its probable survival value 
for the group. 79 He differs, he says, from what he terms "the theory 
of enlightenment" that desires "to transcend actuality", not in his 
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ultimate objective, but in his method. What it hopes to achieve suddenly 
and on an individual basis, he believes can only be achieved through 
progress and "by regarding all mankind as a single entity."80 
Immortality is available to the individual only in terms of the 
consequences of his actions. As Chang writes in A Fledgling Philosophy: 81 
[If there is no undying soul] does that not mean that once we are 
dead we are finished? No. It does not. If, indeed, our universe is a 
complex, living structure, then every one of our actions has 
consequences in its remotest parts. If, indeed, this structure 
incorporates time, and time is not merely a straight line, then the 
influence of our actions not only extends far into the future, but 
also sends waves into the past. .. This is the theory of imperishability. 
The Philosophy of Morals has a similar argument in different terms: 82 
One could say that actual existence at the point of [space-time] 
intersection [that is the present moment] is continually dying ... 
It is not necessary to wait for the body to perish for death to come. 
To emancipate life somewhat from space and time is to extend its 
domain. . . The culture that we humans have invariably seeks to 
remove life from the intersection-point of space and time, and to 
transcend it. The higher this transcendence, the closer, we may say, 
to immortality ... Existence requires knowledge precisely so that it 
may have a means to transcend existence. . .Since mankind came 
into being, all creations of the spirit ... have been a struggle to find 
immortality. . . The individual seeks to extend the domain of his 
life so that he may exist for ever. The accumulation [of such 
endeavours] is culture ... Every individual dies; but the culture that 
he has produced is comparatively immortal. 
Or rather, immortal subject to one proviso. It is necessary to be 
progressive. "If," says Chang, "a person is stationary with respect to the 
advance of human life in the universe, and does not progress, or even 
goes against the current, then - even if his person and actions are known 
to a great number of people - he does not merit the designation 
imperishable. "83 
line is the beginning of future-worship. An individual's life is 
significant only in so far as it is absorbed into what is judged to be, in 
some sense, a forward movement of phenomena. Intrinsic moral values 
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begin to fade. Acts are regarded as good or bad in so far as they speed, or 
hinder, the advent of a certain conception of the future - which is 
destined to recede perpetually. To see this in fully developed fonn, 
let us conclude by looking at two revolutionaries. 
Nowhere does the tension between the desire for a total self-
expression and an ecstatic self-immolation show itself so clearly as in 
the early writings of Kuo Mo-jo (b. 1892), which have been so admirably 
analyzed by Professor David Roy. Here, for example, is Kuo talking 
about poetry: 84 
Only a poem which is a pure manifestation of the poetic feelings 
and images in the mind, a strain flowing from the well of life, 
a melody played on the lute-strings of the heart, a tremor of 
life, a cry of the soul, can be a true poem, a good poem, a 
well-spring of human happiness ... Whenever I encounter such a 
poem .. . I only wish I could swallow it, book, paper, and all. 
Here he is on children: 8s 
There is not a moment of the day when [a child] does not devote 
his entire self to the tasks of creation, expression, and enjoyment. 
The life of a child is the life of a genius in miniature. 
Kuo wanted to become a superchild. 
Little by little, however, he came to feel that self-realization was an 
illicit indulgence until it was equally accessible to everyone. In 1923 he 
declared: 86 
Until the economic systems of the world have been transformed, 
such things as the manifestations of Brahma, the dignity of the 
self, and the gospel of love can only be the morphine or cocaine 
of the propertied and leisured classes, while the members of the 
proletariat are left to soak themselves in sweat and blood. 
And he wrote to a friend that "the literature . . . which transcends 
time and space. . .can only come into being after the realization of 
socialism." 87 
Personal freedom had to be renounced, in a mortification of the 
spirit, so that others might enjoy it later. He wrote:88 
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A world in which everyone will be able to develop his talents . .. , 
in which everyone will be able to find freedom . . .is ... the most 
perfect of worlds. . .If we should not be destined to see the 
coming of such an era .. .in our own lifetimes - and it goes without 
saying that we cannot be so destined - then the only course 
which we, - living in this unfree age, should pursue is to devote 
our efforts to bringing about (itsj realization ... that our posterity 
may soon be free of life' s material bonds. 
Romanticism and revolutionary impulse fused in a cult of action :89 
If all natural phenomena are manifestations of God (he wrote] , 
and I also am a manifestation of God, then I am God, and all 
natural phenomena are manifestations of me. When a man has 
lost his Self and become one with God, he transcends time and 
space, and sees life and death as one ... Energy is the source from 
which all things are created; it is the will of the Universe ... If one 
can achieve union with this energy , one will be aware only of life 
and not death, only of constancy and not change . . .With the 
same energy with which a lion strikes its prey, with the whole 
body and the whole soul, one must seek self-realization in every 
moment. 
So he became a revolutionary writer, hating the beauties of the world 
as an illusion, raging at songbirds that they should dare to warble in the 
gardens of the rich, seeing his work as the artistic equivalent of the 
activist's bomb.90 
This pattern of revolutionary emotion does not have any cxa1:1 
counterpart in Chinese revolutionary theory. Let us take as an example 
the most systematic exposition of Chinese Communist ideology . the 
I 949 edition of The Philosophy of the Masses by Ai Ssu-ch' i ( 1910- 1 %6 ). 
We do not find in its pages any commitment, however qualified, to 
the self-realization of the individual as such, but instead views like the 
following: 9 1 
18 
We have revolutionary thoughts and actions. We exert ourselves 
to serve the great people. This is the main side of our character , 
and an aspect of the path of development of the distant future . 
But we also often contain the dregs of thought of petty-bourgeois 
individualism , and even the dregs of the consciousness of the 
other exploiting classes. We often make calculations for our own 
private profit, which prevents us from serving the people with 
whole heart and whole will. This is the reverse side of our character, 
the rotten side that must be smashed. 
Independence of thought or perception is illusory. Thought has a class 
character. There are no purely rational grounds for deciding the 
validity of an argument. What proves an idea erroneous is its defeat 
in practice. Any failure on the part of a revolutionary tends to indicate 
that his mind is not reflecting reality properly, since knowledge is a 
reflection of the material world that lies about us. Only the minds 
of those who have a working-class standpoint can reflect reality 
unimpaired by selfishness. So, Ai says (and this really is what he says): 92 
If you are resolved to become a very good camera, and able to 
have an accurate knowledge of everything, then you must first 
resolve a basic question, namely, you must take the standpoint 
of the workers and the broad mass of the people. On what basis 
can you be reckoned to have taken the standpoint of the broad 
mass of the people? You must be able to make yourself whole-
heartedly, wholemindedly loyal to the interests of the people, 
that is, you must resolve that all your work, and all your ability, 
shall be used for the task of liberating the broad mass of the 
people; and that you will sacrifice all, without begrudging it, to 
the achievement of this goal .. .If you are able to be like this, 
without the slightest individual selfishness, and in no degree 
affected by the influence on thought of the selfishness and 
vileness of the large landlord or large bourgeois classes, then, 
when you examine a question, you will have no prejudices, no 
anxieties, to impede your understanding the true nature of the 
question to the bottom, then you can obtain a correct knowledge 
of everything. 
There is a link here with Feng Yu-Ian's views, which may be expressed 
as follows: only by taking a working-class standpoint and so escaping 
from the selfishness of the realm of bourgeois Utility can the mind gain 
the understanding of the laws that give it both freedom and power. 
For according to Ai:93 
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If we have not the slightest knowledge of the laws of development 
of society, then our actions are entirely conditioned by our own 
class interests . . .Per contra, if we know the laws of development 
of society . .. we can escape from blindness and consciously tread 
the road of inevitable victory. 
What is more, "if a man's thinking can be in accord with the laws of 
reality, and if he can know these laws in appropriate fashion, then he can 
wield very great strength, and make use of the knowledge of these laws 
to change the reality of the world." 94 In short, "he can comcol 
the world." 95 
But reality is always changing. According to Ai:96 
Everything in this world contains mutually opposed aspects. 
These mutually opposed aspects are constantly conflicting and 
struggling. . . The changes in things, their development, are all 
the outcome of struggles between their opposing aspects. 
So the truth in the revolutionary's mind, which is a reflection of 
reality, though interpreted by theoretical constructs, must always be 
changing too. 97 "Truth is relative," Ai argues. "It is true only under 
certain objective circumstances. When objective circumstances have 
changed, the way in which we look at truth must also changc.'' 98 
Dialectical materialism is required because it is "a method capable of 
[handling] change", so that the method of thought of the person 
who uses it will "conform" with the laws of phenomena, which are also 
chanjng. 99 Of course, he adds, yesterday's outdated views are not 
simply false . Absolute truth is gradually being approached as the limit 
of the sum of partial, relative truths.100 
This is Ai's Hegelian-Marxian-Leninist vision : with an everchanging 
reality and an everchanging theory perfectly attuned and interacting, 
the selfless yet in a sense omnipotent revolutionary becomes one with 
the simultaneous forward march of progress and truth. The Philosophy of 
the Masses opens a vista before us: lOI 
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Once we have a knowledge of these laws, we can have a foresighted 
understanding of the trend of future developments ... We can guide 
our actions in accordance with these predictions, and cause our 
actions to be without error, cause ourselves to be able to walk on 
the road of growth, and not on the road of destruction. 
We have reached the end of the survey I promised; and it would 
seem appropriate to draw together some conclusions. Yet I hesitate to 
do so. Looking at thinkers in the highly selective fashion that I have 
adopted inevitably distorts the overall balance and arrangement of their 
ideas. Emphasis has been laid on the common fascination felt by our 
subjects for the absorption of the self into a greater totality or process, 
and the measure of covert psychological self-aggrandizement sometimes 
contained therein. A different approach, a different selection of 
topics, might easily suggest that the differences were of more weight 
than the similarities. Nor am I confident that there is any clear trend 
from 1890 to 1950. At one time I should have been tempted to argue 
for an increasing philosophic concern with the practical, and pointed to 
the shift of thought apparent in Chang Tung-sun's Democracy and 
Socialism of 1948 as the kind of evidence on which such a case might 
be built. Yet, as Professor Wakeman has pointed out, K'ang Yu-wei 
was philosophically concerned with practicability and developed a 
doctrine of relativistic ethics in consequence. 10~ At a more superficial 
level, of course, there was an immense increase in Chinese knowledge of 
the Western philosophic tradition; 103 but the interesting and more difficult 
question is, What was being done with that knowledge? Here the evidence 
presented tonight suggests that, in many respects, it was being pressed 
into the service of recognizably traditional goals. It is still? Here 
hesitation must become refusal. Least of all do I see deeply enough to 
wish to guess for you what the great river of Chinese philosophy, 
which has now flowed underground these thirty years, will be like when 
it comes up into the sunlight again as, eventually, it must. 
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THE GEORGE ERNEST MORRISON 
LECTURE IN ETHNOLOGY 
The George Ernest Morrison Lecture was founded by Chinese residents 
in Australia and others in honour of the late Dr G.E. Morrison, a native 
of Geelong, Victoria, Australia. 
The objects of the foundation of the lectureship were to honour for 
all time the memory of a great Australian who rendered valuable services 
to China, and to improve cultural relations between China and Aust ral ia . 
The foundation of the lectureship had the official support of the 
Chinese Consulate-General, and was due in particular to the efforts of 
Mr William Liu, merchant, of Sydney; Mr William Ah Ket, barrister, of 
Melbourne; Mr F.J. Quinlan and Sir Colin MacKenzie, of Canberra . 
From the time of its inception until 1948 the lecture was associated with 
the Australian Institute of Anatomy, but in the latter year the responsi-
bility for the management of the lectureship was taken over by the 
Australian National University, and the lectures delivered since that date 
have been give under the auspices of the University. 
The following lectures have been delivered: 
Inaugural : W.P. Chen, The Objects of the Foundation of the Lectureship 
and a review of Dr Morrison's Life in China. I 0 May 19 3 2. 
Second: W. Ah Ket , Eastern Thought, with More Particular R ef erence tu 
Confucius. 3 May 1933. 
Third: J.S. MacDonald, The History and Development of Chinese Arr. 
3 May 1934. 
Fourth: W.P. Chen, The New Culture Movement in China. 10 May 1935. 
Fifth: Wu Lien-teh, Reminiscences of George E. Morrison; and Chinese 
Abroad. 2 September 1936. 
Sixth: Chun-jien Pae, China Today: With Special Reference to Higher 
Education. 4 May 1937. 
Seventh: A.F. Barker, The Impact of Western Industrialism on China. 
17 May 1938. 
Eighth: S.H. Roberts, The Gifts of the Old China to the New. 5 June 1939. 
Ninth: Howard Mowll, West China as Seen Through the Eyes of the 
Westerner. 29 May 1949. 
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Tenth: W.G. Goddard, The Ming Shen. A Study in Chinese Democracy. 
5 June 1941 . 
Eleventh: D.B. Copland, The Chinese Social Structure. 27 September 
1948. * 
Twelfth: J.K. Rideout, Politics in Medieval China. 28 October 1949. 
Thirteenth: C.P. FitzGerald, The Revolutionary Tradition in China. 
19 March 1951. 
Fourteenth: H.V. Evatt, Some Aspects of Morrison's Life and Work. 
4 December 1952. 
Fifteenth: Lord Lindsay of Birker, China and the West. 20 October 1953. 
Sixteenth: M. Titiev, Chinese Elements in Japanese Culture. 27 July 1954. 
Seventeenth: H. Bielenstein, Emperor Kuang-Wu (A.D.25-27) and the 
Northern Barbarians. 2 November 1955. * 
Eighteenth: Leonard B. Cox, The Buddhist Temples of Yun-Kang and 
Lung-Men. 17 October 19 56. * 
Nineteenth: Otto P.N. Berkelbach van der Sprenkel, The Chinese Civil 
Service. 4 November 19 57. 
Twentieth: A.R. Davies, The Na"ow Lane: Some Observations on the 
Recluse in Traditional Chinese Society. 19 November 1958. 
Twenty-first: C.N. Spinks, The Khmer Temple of Prah Vihar. 6 October 
1959.* 
Twenty-second: Chen Chih-mai, Chinese Landscape Painting: The 
Golden Age. 5 October 1960. * 
Twenty-third: L. Carrington Goodrich, China's Contacts with Other 
Parts of Asia in Ancient Times. 1 August 1961.* 
Twenty-fourth: N.G.D. Malmqvist, Problems and Methods in Chinese 
Linguistics. 22 November 1962. * 
Twenty-fifth: H.F. Simon, Some Motivations of Chinese Foreign Policy. 
3 October 1963. 
Twenty-sixth: Wang Ling, Calendar, Cannon and Clock in the Cultural 
Relations between Europe and China . 18 November 1964. 
Twenty-seventh: A.M. Halpern, Chinese Foreign Policy - Success or 
Failure? 9 August 1966. * 
Twenty-eighth: J.W. de Jong. Buddha's Word in China. 18 October 1967. * 
Twenty-ninth: J.D. Frodsham, New Perspectives in Chinese Literature. 
23 July 1968.* 
Thirtieth: E.A. Huck, The Assimilation of the Chinese in Australia. 
6 November 1969. * 
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Thirty-first : K.A. Wittfogel, Agriculture: A Key to the Understanding 
of Chinese Society, Past and Present. 6 April 1970. * 
Thirty-second: I. de Rachewiltz, Prester John and Europe's Discovery 
of East Asia. 3 November 1971 . * 
Thirty-third : Eugene Kamenka, Marx, Marxism and China. 6 September 
1972. 
Thirty-fourth : Liu Ts'un-yan , On the Art of Ruling a Big Country: 
Views of Three Chinese Emperors. 13 November 1973. * 
Thirty-fifth : Jerome Ch'en, Peasant Activism in Contemporary China . 
22 July 1974. 
Thirty-sixth : Yi-fu Tuan, Chinese Attitudes to Nature: Idea and R eality. 
3 September 1975. 
Thirty-seventh : Lo Hui-Min, The Tradition and Prototypes of the 
China-Watcher. 27 October t 976. * 
Thirty-eighth : Roy Hofheinz, People, Places and Politics in Modem 
China. 17 August 1977. 
* Available from Director's Office, Research School of Pacific Studies. 
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